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ABSTRACT 
Prior research establishes that international control by multinational corporations is based on three dimensions: centralisation, 
formalisation and socialisation. New control mechanisms appeared in the last decade, such as enterprise resource planning, short- term 
assignments and regional centres. Do these new mechanisms fit the three control dimensions? How do MNCs articulate their control 
mechanisms, including new ones? Using interviews with 77 managers of 47 French MNCs in 11 Asian countries, this study presents an 
exploratory factor analysis and clustering. The findings show that French MNCs control their Asian subsidiaries through four 
dimensions: centralisation of decision making, formalisation of subsidiaries, socialisation and expatriation. 
Key words: Multinational companies, Subsidiaries, Regional organisation, Control, Asia 
RÉSUMÉ 
Le contrôle à l'international de leurs activités par les multinationales implique trois dimensions: centralisation, formalisation et 
socialisation. De nouveaux mécanismes de contrôle (les ERP, les missions de court terme, les sièges régionaux...) se sont développés 
récemment. S'inscrivent-ils dans ces trois dimensions? Comment les multinationales articulent-elles l'ensemble des mécanismes de 
contrôle ? L'analyse des réponses de 77 cadres de 47 multinationales françaises dans 11 pays d'Asie, par factorisation et classification 
hiérarchique, révèle quatre dimensions de contrôle : centralisation de la décision, formalisation des filiales, socialisation et expatriation. 
Cinq types de multinationales se distinguent selon la combinaison des mécanismes de contrôles. 
Mots clés : Firmes multinationales, Filiales, Structures régionales, Contrôle, Asie 
RESUMEN 
Las multinacionales controlan sus activida- des al internacional según tres dimensiones: centralización- formalización- socialización. 
Recientemente, nuevos mecanismos de control se han desarrollado (ERP, misiones de corto plazo, sedes regionales…). Esos elementos 
se inscriben en esas tres dimensiones? Cómo las multinacionales coordinan el conjunto de los mecanismos de control? Analizando las 
respuestas de 77 jefes de 47 multinacionales francesas instaladas en 11 países asiáticos, según un proceso de factorización y clasificación 
jerárquica, este estudio revela cuatro dimensiones de control: centralización de la decisión, formalización de las sucursales, socialización 
y expatriación. Cinco tipos de multinacionales resalten entonces según la combinación de sus mecanismos de control. 
Palabras claves: Empresas multinacionales, Sucursales, Estructuras regionales, Control, Asia 
Multinational corporations (MNCs) have considerably expanded their networks of subsidiaries worldwide1. In some cases, they seek 
efficiency and lower production costs; in others, they search for new market opportunities; in some countries, they pursue these different 
goals simultaneously. Thus, MNCs transfer their activities—including production, sales and research and development (R&D)—across 
national borders. How do MNCs coordinate and control their widespread activities from their headquarters (HQ) at home ? 
Geringer and Hebert (1989: 236–37) define control as ‘the process by which one entity influences, to varying degrees, the behaviour 
and output of another entity through the use of power, authority and a wide range of bureaucratic, cultural and informal mechanisms’. 
This paper addresses two complementary research questions. First, considering new control mechanisms such as ERP, travel, short-term 
assignments (Mayerhofer et al. 2004; Tahvanainen et al. 2005; Welch et al. 2007) and the use of regional HQ (Enright 2005a, 2005b; 
Piekkari et al. 2010; Alfoldi et al. 2012; Amann et al. 2014), we investigate whether they fit the theoretically well-established Centralisation 
– Formalisation - Socialisation (CFS) framework of control (Goshal and Nhoria 1989; Nobel and Birkinshaw 1998; Ambos and 
Schlegelmilch 2010). Specifically, how do these new control mechanisms complement more traditional ones? Second, we consider how 
MNCs implement and articulate dimensions of an extended CFS framework, to retain control of their subsidiaries.  
To address these questions, we conducted 77 semi-structured, face-to-face interviews during 2009–2012 with managers in charge of 
subsidiaries in Asia established by 47 French multinational companies in 11 countries. By combining a qualitative content analysis of 
these interview transcripts with an exploratory factor analysis, we obtain some answers to our central research questions.  
First, the control of the subsidiaries of French MNCs in Asia features four dimensions: (1) centralisation of decision making and 
reporting at HQ; (2) formalisation of the organisation of subsidiaries and the relations between subsidiaries and HQ; (3) informal contacts 
and socialisation, through intensive short- term missions and visits, facilitated by the establishment of regional headquarters in the Asia 
Pacific; and (4) expatriation. These results, as we will show, are quite consistent with the well- established CFS framework. Second, we 
identify five categories of MNCs that adopt each control dimension to different degrees. In the case of ERPs, it appears that they do not 
fit any specific control dimension and instead support socialisation, regional recentralisation and formalisation but oppose centralisation. 
In the remainder of this article, we first emphasise that control over networks of subsidiaries abroad requires a multidimensional 
approach. Then we describe our empirical methodology and outline our findings. We finally discuss these results. 
 
Multidimensionality of Control Mechanisms for Subsidiaries Abroad 
 
Classical Literature on Control: The CFS Framework 
In their description of the evolution of research on coordination mechanisms in MNCs between 1953 and 1988, Martinez and Jarillo 
(1989) identify three main research streams. The first concentrates on MNCs’ organisational structure, including their use of international 
divisions, or product, area or matrix organisations. The second stream focuses on decision-making centralisation or autonomy and 
bureaucratic control, including formalisation, standardisation and reporting. The third stream investigates informal and subtle 
mechanisms, such as informal communication, transfers of managers, behavioural control, socialisation, expatriation, visits, networks 
of people and corporate cultures. 
Ghoshal and Nohria (1989), studying headquarters–subsidiary relations, find that the optimal fit between environmental contexts 
and subsidiaries requires a differentiated combination of three elements: centralisation of decision making, formalisa- tion (use of 
systematic decision-making rules and procedures) and normative integration, with consensus or shared values as bases for decision 
making. Centralisation implies governance mechanisms in which the decision-making process is hierarchical, such that HQ makes most 
crucial strategic and policy decisions. To identify the degree of centralisation, they measure the degree of autonomy that HQ grant to 
subsidiaries to make decisions about their own strategies, such as the design of new products, manufacturing or senior human resource 
management. Ghoshal and Nohria interpret formalisation as routine decision making and resource allocation: they ask if the MNC uses 
manuals, standing orders, and procedures to ensure that rules have not been violated. Finally, they explain that normative integration 
leads to shared values, which require investments in socialisation. The main instruments of normative integration are the time the 
subsidiary managers work at HQ, the presence of HQ mentors for subsidiary managers and the number of HQ visits to subsidiaries. In 
their empirical survey, normative integration is referred to as socialisation, a widely used term in organisation theory. 
Nine years later, Nobel and Birkinshaw (1998) confirmed that the three modes of control had been well established in organisation 
theory. They describe centralisation as the decision-making power retained by HQ over topics such as the firm’s direction, new projects, 
standards, budgets, hiring, cooperation, training and compensation. The question of whether centralisation of decision making 
represents a control mechanism remains though. Even if decision making is centralised at the HQ level, subsidiaries still might be only 
minimally constrained with regard to following centralised decisions. Perhaps then the centralisation of decision making represents a 
first step in centralising control. We address this question more comprehensively in our empirical investigation. 
 
Recent Operationalisations of the CFS Framework 
Between 2005 and 2010, several empirical studies of control-related issues adopted a CFS framework, using similar variables but with 
some variations. We describe a few of them here, together with the classical studies we described previously, in Table 1. 
                                                     
1 The term “network” in this paper is used in the perspective highlighted by Kostova et alii (2016: 180) “... the network concept became a common tool to describe both the intra-
firm and inter-firm space where MNCs operate” as well as the literature cited by these authors 
Harzing and Noorderhaven (2006) study subsidiaries in Australia and New Zealand and identify three control mechanisms: (1) 
autonomy, which is the opposite of centralisation (e.g., design, pricing, advertising of products for local markets), (2) control by 
socialisation and networks (e.g., international task forces, training, informal communication with HQ, shared values) and (3) formal 
control (formalisation, planning, reporting, ERP). Output control, underlined as a specific dimension of control by Harzing (1999), 
appears in a formal control dimension (reporting) in Harzing and Noorderhaven’s (2006: 172). Harzing and Noorderhaven also consider 
expatriation (number, nationality, key positions of expatriates) as a stand-alone complementary control mechanism. 
Appointing expatriates to key management positions in a subsidiary is often crucial for developing activities abroad; it is also a main 
instrument of control over overseas subsidiaries (Perlmutter and Heenan 1974; Edström and Galbraith 1997). Harzing (2001) argues that 
expatriates tend to be appointed as general managers or chief financial officers of a subsidiary abroad, rather than to more locally 
oriented functions, such as marketing. MNCs rely heavily on expatriates for several reasons. First, their positions require constant 
interactivity with HQ. The informal networks that expatriates may have developed previously within the MNC, and particularly at HQ, 
should provide a good foundation for effective interactions. Second, managing subsidiaries requires precise knowledge of the MNC’s 
processes and the ways it does things. Especially if a subsidiary has been created recently, only expatriates have such knowledge 
(Schaaper et al. 2013). 
Ambos and Schlegelmilch (2010) also build on the CFS framework and use Nobel and Birkinshaw’s (1998: 483) definitions of 
centralisation (‘decision making power retained at the headquarters’), formalisation (‘routinised decision making power through rules 
and procedures’) and socialisation (‘developing common expectations and shared values among organisation members that promote 
like-minded decision making’). They operationalise the CFS framework and validate its control mechanisms and dimensions with a 
factor analysis. 
Finally, Chen et al. (2009, 2010) argue for an organisational control framework with three broad control types: (1) output control, 
which measures and rewards outcomes through goal setting, performance evaluation and executive rewards; (2) process control, which 
monitors ongoing behaviour through rules, regulations, organisational structure, job descriptions and reporting; and (3) social control, 
which aims to influence embedded values through training, teams and socialisation of managers. We retrieve the formalisation (process 
control) and socialisation (social control) dimensions of control, but in this case, these authors replaced centralisation with output control. 
 
Trends in International Control 
New forms of control have emerged in the past decade. As mentioned by Kostova et alii (2016: 181) “New technologies in 
communication and information processing, travel, and production processes have made managing widely dispersed organizational  
elements simpler, more reliable, and much less expensive than in the recent past, reducing the need for vast global bureaucracies to 
manage multinational firms through command and control from HQs.”. We focus especially on worldwide ERP, increased travel and 
regional organisations, especially in the Asia Pacific. 
Enterprise resource planning 
Introduced in the early 1990s, ERP systems have helped support globalisation. One of the main goals of ERP is to gain managerial control 
over the firm’s operations (Schein 1992; Schwartz and Brock 1998; Davenport 1998; Willis and Chiasson 2007), yet academic research has 
not reached a consensus about whether ERP leads to more centralised or decentralised decision making. In the interviews they conducted, 
Willis and Chiasson (2007: 222) found that the ‘overall objective [of ERP] … justified the goals of centralised control’. Schwarz and Brock 
(1998) list three reasons ERP leads to more centralised control: (1) shortening feedback loops, even if the number of hierarchical levels 
rises; (2) requiring more central management to validate solutions to shared problems, derived from inflexible ERP; and (3) seeking to 
take advantage of economies of scale by sharing production capacities. According to Davenport (1998), ERP centralises control  and 
standardises processes. Yet he also highlights the paradoxical impact of ERP on firm organisations and culture: They lead to higher 
degrees of centralisation, but the availability of real-time data streamlines management structures and creates more flexible 
organisations. Schwarz and Brock (1998) also remark on this paradox: ERP facilitates new organisational structures, but the wider 
availability of information to all employees facilitates communication, stronger management teams and thus social control. With a 
quantitative survey of 156 companies in China, Wang (2007) asserts that the deployment of ERP leads to flatter, more decentralised and 
more standardised organisational structures. We can conclude from this short literature overview that ERP systems might contribute to 
more centralization and/or more socialization. 
Increased travel and short-term assignments 
The development of high-speed, global travel, and the remarkable progress in information and communication technologies, have 
changed the way people work, especially across borders. Bonache et al. (2010), Tahvanainen et al. (2005), Welch et al. (2007) and 
Mayerhofer et al. (2004) identify various short-term international assignments that complement the crucial but costly expatriation. 
Several studies emphasise the increased use of short-term assignments, especially to subsidiaries in China, the Indian subcontinent and 
South-East Asia (Petrovich et al. 2000; PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2005; Bonache et al. 2010; Cartus, 2010). Welch et al. (2007) show that, 
through frequent visits, short-term assignees collect and transfer information and knowledge about foreign markets and operations, 
such that they serve as ‘powerful knowledge transfer agents’. 
Mayerhofer et al. (2004) find that the main purposes of short-term assignments are to provide expert knowledge, solve technical 
problems, conduct audits, attend meetings and conferences and deliver training. Tahvanainen et al. (2005) cite three reasons for short-
term assignments, one of which is managerial control. According to Bozkurt and Mohr (2011), short-term assignees visit subsidiaries 
abroad to bring skills and knowledge to specific locations on short notice. They highlight that MNCs tend to send experts from different 
parts of the network, who then join together on location. Overall, short-term assignees complement expatriates in their control function, 
but they also seem to play an important role in circulating information throughout the network of subsidiaries. Both Ghoshal and Nohria 
(1998) and Nobel and Birkinshaw (1998) regard short-term assignments as an element of the socialisation dimension of control. 
Regional organisation of MNCs 
With an empirical survey of 130 MNCs, Yeung et al. (2001) find that Western MNCs frequently set up regional HQ in Asia to integrate 
their activities and exercise greater control over sub- sidiaries. Amann et al. (2014) further argue that regional HQ offer intermediate 
governance structures, with core coordination and integration functions. Kostova et alii (2016: 180) confirms that “many MNCs  had 
begun developing regional centers of coordination and control “. However, the term ‘regional headquarters’ cannot capture the full 
variety of regional management structures that MNCs use in Asia, including regional operating headquarters (Yin and Walsh 2011), 
regional offices (Poon and Thompson 2003) and sub-regional headquarters. Similar to Enright (2005), we refer to these diverse regional 
management structures as regional management centres. Mori (2002) explains that regional HQ benefit from strong decision autonomy 
and a wide regional integration scope, whereas other regional management centres, such as regional offices, supply chain platforms, 
representative offices and holdings, fall under the stronger control of a global or regional HQ. In parallel, in a survey of 696 regional 
management centres in Asia, Enright (2005) finds that only fully functional centres assume key functions, such that they can be perceived 
as regional HQ. Other types of regional management centres have less decision autonomy and execute more operational roles, such as 
coordination, reporting, technical support or marketing. 
This short overview of the academic literature shows that the centralisation of decision making is at least partially transfered from the 
global HQs to RHQs in the Asia Pacific. We call this the regional re-centralisation. This is in line with the global trend noted by Kostova 
et alii (2016: 180) “Indeed, with greater autonomy being granted to local subsidiaries, many MNCs had begun developing regional centers 
of coordination and control to better seize regional opportunities, and leverage local resources and knowledge throughout the entire 
organization.” 
Recent trends in control by Western MNCs in Asia 
As stated previously, Western MNCs have developed their activities in Asia tremendously in the past three or four decades, 
multiplying the number of countries in which they carry out their business, as well as the number of subsidiaries in each of these 
countries. As a consequence they have widely developed control systems in Asia. 
Harzing and Noorderhaven (2006) identify the CFS model of control (Ghoshal and Nohria 1989) as relevant for the context of MNCs 
in Asia, though they consider expatriation as a stand-alone dimension. Expatriation has had crucial influences on the development of 
Western MNCs’ business in Asia, as well as on the control and development of formal control systems (Harzing 2001; Jaussaud and 
Schaaper 2006). The high costs and frequent failures associated with expatriation also have prompted MNCs to rely a lot on short-term 
assignments to subsidiaries in Asia on the one hand (Petrovich et al. 2000; Bonache et al. 2010; Cartus, 2010) and on localisation of 
management positions on the other hand (Schaaper et al., 2013). With regard to centralisation, we note a shift in the dominant mode for 
setting up subsidiaries in Asia, from joint ventures prior to the 1980s to wholly owned subsidiaries since the 1990s (Hubler and Meschi, 
2001; Jaussaud and Schaaper, 2006) 
Furthermore, facing vast geographical, cultural and institutional distances, Western MNCs in Asia have strengthened their 
hierarchical structures and introduced regional HQ or other regional structures to create intermediate levels of decision making and 
control (Yeung et al., 2001; Poon and Thompson 2003; Yin and Walsh 2011; Amann et al. 2014). Setting up regional and sub-regional 
structures may help limit the number of required expatriates; for example, a finance expatriate may supervise several locals in the field 
across different subsidiaries (Amann et al. 2014). Finally, most MNCs in the area have deployed ERP systems in the past two decades 




Attribution of control mechanisms to CFS dimensions by prior empirical research 
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Decision making centralised x   x   x           
Direct supervision       x           






Reports, reporting     x  x   x    x  x  
Integrated planning and ERP       x   x   x     
Organisational structure similar to HQ                x  
Processes and routines similar to HQ                x  
Overall business operations similar to HQ                  
Manuals, standing orders  x                
Standards, written procedures  x   x   x  x   x   x  
Rules and policies  x   x   x          
Job description                x  
 
Output control 
Output control       x      x  x   
Goal setting               x   
Performance evaluation               x   







Periods working at HQ/subsidiary   x               
Mentoring at HQ   x               
HQ visits to subsidiary   x   x            
Informal communication with HQ           x       
On-the-job rotation; personnel exchange      x   x         
Training      x   x  x      x 
Shared values, corporate culture         x  x   x   x 
Joint teams         x  x   x   x 
Socialisation of subsidiary employees              x   x 
Expatriate control Expatriated managers in key positions         x   x      
 
Control of Subsidiary Networks: A Multidimensional Approach 
On the basis of vast syntheses of academic literature, Martinez and Jarillo (1989) and Jaussaud and Schaaper (2006) show that MNCs 
rely on a large variety of instruments to exercise control over their subsidiaries abroad. An appropriate combination of these 
instruments—which depends on the context in which the subsidiaries operate and the functions they conduct, such as production, sales 
or R&D—is key to effective control (Schaan 1988; Geringer and Hebert 1989; Martinez and Jarillo 1989; Ghoshal and Nohria 1989; Yan 
and Gray, 2001; Kumar and Seth 1998; Chen et al. 2009, 2010). As Ghoshal and Nohria (1989) note, integrative processes are costly, and 
an efficient structure relies on a combination of integrative devices that reflect optimal trade-offs of the costs of each element and its 
efficacy in a specified context. Nobel and Birkinshaw (1998) consider the control modes complementary, such that any parent–subsidiary 
relation is liable to exhibit elements of centralisation, formalisation and socialisation. 
We wonder whether the control trends we have highlighted (i.e., worldwide ERP, increased travel and short-term assignments, and 
regional headquarters) align with traditional control mechanisms and thereby fit the CFS framework. In line with Harzing and 
Noorderhaven (2006) and Jaussaud and Schaaper (2006), we also wonder whether expatriate control constitutes a separate control 
dimension, beyond centralisation, formalisation or socialisation. Only a few studies investigate the relationship between control 
mechanisms, mostly for the case of international joint ventures (e.g. Liu et al., 2014). possibly because of the need for vast data sets to 
investigate the interactions among control dimensions. With the data we have collected, we make investigating this interaction a central 
objective of this research. 
Moreover, we predict that ERP might lead simultaneously to more centralisation and socialisation and that short-term assignments 
reflect socialisation, whereas regional HQs provide a means to centralise decision-making autonomy in the Asian region. In Table 2, we 




Control mechanisms theoretically 
attributed to the extended CFS framework 
Centralisation 
• Decision making centralised at HQ versus autonomous 
subsidiaries 
• Regional headquarters (RHQ) and regional management 
centres (RMCs) 
• Reporting to HQ2 
• ERP 
Formalisation 
• Organisational structure and processes similar to HQ’s 
• Standards and written procedures, rules, policies 
• Job descriptions 
• Level of reporting 
Socialisation/informal control 
• HQ visits to subsidiary and short-term assignments 
• Informal communication with HQ 
• On-the-job rotation; personnel exchange 
• Shared values, corporate culture 
• Training 
• Socialisation of subsidiary employees 
• ERP 
Expatriate control 
• Number of expatriates 
• Functions of expatriates 
 
 
                                                     





We adopted a qualitative approach, with semi-structured interviews of 77 high-ranking managers of subsidiaries of 47 French MNCs 
in Asia between 2009 and 2012. We carefully selected French MNCs operating in various countries in Asia and in different sectors (Table 
3). The respondents were expatriates (but one local). Using the theoretical framework, we prepared a semi-structured interview guide, 
starting with questions about the history of the MNC and its various entry modes in the country. A series of open-ended questions then 
aimed to detail the MNC’s policies on regional strategic decision making, expatriation, localisation of key functions, (de)centralisat ion 
of strategic and operational decisions, ERP, written procedures, job descriptions and processes, budget procedures, reporting, the 
harmonisation of formalisation, contacts between subsidiary managers and managers at HQ, meetings between managers of different 
subsidiaries in Asia and at HQ, training of local workers and managers, short-term visits and assignments, intra-Asian assignments, job 
rotation, shared values, corporate culture, socialisation actions and so on. 
At the request of the interviewees, we provide neither their personal nor the company names, which encouraged them to speak freely 
without asking for permission from their HQ. For the same reason, we indicate the industries in broad terms. All the MNCs in our 
sample are major players in their industries. 
 
Data Analysis 
We followed the methodological steps recommended by Silverman (2006: 158-164) and Miles and Huberman (1994: 50-65). The 
contents of the interviews, which lasted between one and two hours each, were fully transcribed. We entered the transcripts of the 77 
interviews into a thematic content analysis grid, with one column per subsidiary or regional Asian headquarters, and one line per 
identified relevant answer to each question from the interview guide. Columns related to the same MNC (e.g., case AA, from which we 
interviewed expatriates in five countries) were grouped together, producing a content table with 47 columns, each representing a 
different French MNC. 
We then set up an initial list of codes or categories, including keywords, short sentences that we expected to find, according to our 
conceptual framework in Table 2 (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Through a horizontal reading of each question or item on the thematic 
content analysis grid, we carefully reduced the interviews with these codes, MNC per MNC, cell per cell. This first coding analysis 
revealed some supplementary regularities pertaining to our research questions, leading us to add a small series of emerging codes to 
the initial list (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Again following Miles and Huberman (1994), to ensure reliability, different members of the 
team undertook the coding, and any differences in the results were discussed and settled. 
Next, we added various contextual variables, drawn from the annual reports of the 47 MNCs, which enabled us to contextualise their 
organisational choices. Pertinent additional variables included the number and location of production factories in Asia, countries with 
a commercial and/or production presence in Asia, global employment, employment in Asia, turnover worldwide, turnover in Asia and 
the percentage of Asian turnover in the global turnover. 
After the coding, we transformed the reduced content analysis grid into a data file, to prepare our exploratory statistical analysis 
(Silverman, 2006). Most questions in the interview guide referred directly to the extent to which the interviewed MNC used specific 
mechanisms to exercise control over subsidiaries. For example, answers to ‘Who makes strategic decisions in the Asia Pacific region?’, 
‘Who makes operational decisions in the Asia Pacific region?’ and ‘When discrepancies appear in reporting, who takes corrective 
measures?’ informed us about the degree of centralisation of decision making and reporting. With this approach, we address the 
possibility that centralised control is not limited to centralised decision making but also might entail the centralisation of reporting. Most 
variables were coded on an ordinal, five-point scale. For example, the codes for the level of centralisation variable span from 1 = 
‘autonomy for subsidiaries’ to 5 = ‘control is centralised at HQ’. A fresh examination of the content analysis grid, in its qualitatively 
coded version, and repeated readings of the initial interview transcripts, helped us determine the degree of use of each control 
mechanism very precisely, translated to the ordinal five-point scales. This assessment gained relevance when we interviewed more than 
one subsidiary of an MNC in two or more countries (as was the case for 20 of the 47 interviewed MNCs), because the discourses of the 
interviewed managers often were complementary and reinforcing. Table A1 in the Appendix reproduces the links among the dimensions 
of the theoretical CFS framework, the corresponding questions on the interview guide and the exact coding and labels for the variables 
in our factor analysis. 
Despite the loss of meaning caused by exploratory statistical analyses with a coded data file drawn from interviews, Myers (2008) 
argues that they can lead to clear and repeatable results. In our case, an exploratory principal component analysis produced a component 
plot, positioning 13 control mechanisms from our data file in a circle (Figure 1). A complementary hierarchical clustering validates the 
extended CFS framework. The principal component analysis also enables us to compute object scores (for MNCs), positioned on an 
object diagram (Figure 2). The hierarchical clustering of these objects (MNCs) and a parallel analysis of the component plot of variables 
and the objects diagram indicates which dimensions of control in the extended CFS framework the specific clusters of MNCs use, in 





















Turnover in Asia 
CA 2 Aviation [10 000 - 30 000] [2 - 5 ] Big Confidential 
SB 2 Pharmaceutical industry [10 000 - 30 000] [2 - 5 ] Big Confidential 
RB 1 Electrical protection [< 5000] [< 1 ] Small-scale Very small 
SA 1 Lingerie production [5000 - 10 000] [< 1 ] Small-scale Very small 
VB 1 Construction [10 000 - 30 000] [2 - 5 ] Big Very small 
WA 1 Beauty [5000 - 10 000] [1 - 2 ] Middle-sized Very small 
EA 3 Animal health [5000 - 10 000] [2 - 5 ] Middle-sized Small 
VA 1 Insurance [10 000 - 30 000] [> 10 ] Big 1 
DA 2 Electricity [> 100 000] [> 10 ] Giant 3 
IA 1 Hospitality [> 100 000] [2 - 5 ] Big 6 
MA 2 Automotive equipment [30 000 - 100 000] [5 - 10 ] Big 6 
UA 1 Agriculture [5000 - 10 000] [1 - 2 ] Middle-sized 7 
MB 1 Distribution [> 100 000] [> 10 ] Giant 8 
NA 1 Press [5000 - 10 000] [1 - 2 ] Middle-sized 8 
RA 1 Automobile [30 000 - 100 000] [> 10 ] Giant 8 
FA 5 Oil [30 000 - 100 000] [> 10 ] Giant 10 
QB 2 Automobile [> 100 000] [> 10 ] Giant 10 
DB 2 Optical [30 000 - 100 000] [2 - 5 ] Big 11 
EB 2 Automotive equipment [> 100 000] [> 10 ] Giant 11 
HA 1 Electrical Equipment [10 000 - 30 000] [2 - 5 ] Big 11 
KA 2 Food [30 000 - 100 000] [5 - 10 ] Big 12 
UB 1 Pharmaceutical industry [> 100 000] [> 10 ] Giant 12 
FB 3 Water treatment [30 000 - 100 000] [5 - 10 ] Big 13 
GB 2 Civil–military security [30 000 - 100 000] [5 - 10 ] Big 14 
TA 1 Video games [< 5000] [< 1 ] Small-scale 14 
JA 1 Household appliances [10 000 - 30 000] [2 - 5 ] Big 15 
LA 1 Health [5000 - 10 000] [1 - 2 ] Middle-sized 15 
OA 1 Electricity [10 000 - 30 000] [5 - 10 ] Big 15 
BA 2 Construction [30 000 - 100 000] [5 - 10 ] Big 16 
KB 1 Civil engineering [< 5000] [< 1 ] Small-scale 16 
PA 1 Advertising [5000 - 10 000] [1 - 2 ] Middle-sized 16 
GA 2 Beauty [30 000 - 100 000[ [> 10 ] Giant 18 
AB 3 Telecom components [30 000 - 100 000] [> 10 ] Giant 19 
IB 1 Heavy industry [5000 - 10 000] [1 - 2 ] Middle-sized 20 
QA 2 Electrical equipment [> 100 000] [> 10 ] Giant 21 
AA 5 Industrial gas [30 000 - 100 000] [5 - 10 ] Big 22 
HB 1 Animal health [< 5000] [< 1 ] Small-scale 23 
LB 2 Computer software [5000 - 10 000] [1 - 2 ] Middle-sized 23 
PB 2 Chemistry [10 000 - 30 000] [5 - 10 ] Big 24 
BB 3 Aviation [> 100 000] [> 10 ] Giant 25 
XA 1 Water treatment [< 5000] [1 - 2 ] Middle-sized 25 
NB 1 Garment [< 5000] [< 1 ] Small-scale 30 
WB 1 Mining [10 000 - 30 000] [2 - 5 ] Big 31 
TB 1 Luxury [< 5000] [1 - 2 ] Middle-sized 39 
CB 1 Satellite images [< 5000] [< 1 ] Small-scale 40 
OB 1 Luxury [5000 - 10 000] [1 - 2 ] Middle-sized 40 
JB 1 Insurance [> 100 000] [> 10 ] Giant 41 
Table 3: Sample of 47 French MNCs interviewed in eleven Asian countries (2009–2012), namely the People's Republic of China including Hong Kong, 





Validation of the Extended CFS Framework 
The correlation matrix (Table A2, Appendix) shows 40 significant (p < 0.05) correlation coefficients among 783, suggesting a 
satisfactory principal component factor analysis (PCFA). In a series of PCFA, with Varimax rotation on SPSS 18.0, starting with all 
initially coded variables, we eliminated the least representative variables. Four axes showed Eigenvalues greater than 1.0. We eliminated 
any variables with communalities on four factor axes lower than 0.45. However, even if its communality was lower than 0.45, we retained 
an item if its factor loading on at least one axis was greater than 0.45 (or smaller than –0.45). These soft elimination criteria matched our 
goal of preserving as many control items as we could, while still ensuring an interpretable factor map4. Thirteen variables thus entered 
the final PCFA. The variance explained by the first four factor axes was, respectively, 23.3%, 18.6%, 15.3% and 14.5%, for a total of 71.8%. 
Table 4 reproduces the factor loadings of the first four components. The bold coefficients are greater than 0.425 (or less than -0.425), thus 




A hierarchical clustering of the 13 retained variables produced a classification tree (Figure A1, Appendix) that assigns control 
mechanisms to a control dimension of the extended CFS framework. On the basis of this hierarchical clustering, together with the bold 
factor loadings in Table 4, we derive a final PCFA plot (Figure 1) that contains five dimensions of control with inter-correlated control 
mechanisms: centralisation, formalisation, training, expatriation and socialisation/ regional decentralisation. Among those five 
dimensions, as Table 4 shows, training is shared across the dimensions of our extended CFS model (centralisation, formalisation, 
socialisation and expatriation). 
In Table 5, we compare the control mechanisms theoretic- ally attributed to a specific dimension of the CFS framework (Table 2) 
against their empirical hierarchical cluster position on the factor map. This comparison affirms that the Centralisation dimension 
comprises ‘centralisation of decision making at HQ’ and ‘reporting is centralised at HQ’, which are traditional control mechanisms. 
Regional HQ and other regional management centres do not belong to the centralisation dimension though; instead, they appear in the 
Socialisation dimension of control. Nor does the ERP control mechanism belong to Centralisation, in contrast with our prediction. We 
find complete validation for the Formalisation dimension, such that it consists of four control mechanisms: ‘subsidiaries are  equally 
formalised worldwide’, ‘written procedures’, ‘written job descriptions’ and a high level of ‘reporting documents to be produced by 
subsidiaries’. For the question of ‘output control’ (Harzing 1999), we find that it contributes to both Centralisation and Formalisation 
dimensions, respectively, in the form of ‘centralising reporting at HQ’ and ‘level of reporting’. 
                                                     
3 The 13 control mechanisms, correlated with 12 control mechanisms, produce [(13 × 12)/2) = 78 coefficients. 
4 The KMO measure of sampling adequacy statistic = 0.70; Bartlett’s test of sphericity = 303 (p < 0.000). 
 
We also validate Expatriation as a stand-alone control dimension (Harzing and Noorderhaven 2006); it is not included in Socialisation, 
as Ambos and Schlegelmilch (2010) suggest. This dimension contains the ‘number of expatriates’ that MNCs send to their Asian 
subsidiaries and their ‘key functions in subsidiary management’. The Socialisation dimension also validates two control mechanisms: 
‘visits and short-term assignments to subsidiaries’ and ‘frequent informal contacts between subsidiary managers with HQ managers’, 
which are correctly correlated (at 0.436). In addition, both control mechanisms correlate (0.05 level) with the existence of ‘regional HQ’ 
and a significant ‘number of regional management centres’. Thus, the four control mechanism together form a Socialisation dimension 
of control. 
However, we cannot validate three control mechanisms: ‘on-the-job rotation and personnel exchange’, ‘shared values and corporate 
culture’ and ‘socialisation action toward the subsidiary’s employees’. This lack of validation likely arises because small- and medium-
sized MNCs generally lack clear, well-designed policies for job rotation, personnel exchanges, socialisation or the diffusion of shared 
values. As a result, there were not enough cases to codify for the data analysis. We excluded these variables. 
Finally, similar to Ambos and Schlegelmilch (2010) who could not validate training in their construction of a socialisation dimension 
of control, on our factor map, ‘training’ is a stand-alone dimension. The hierarchical cluster (Figure A1, Appendix) and correlation matrix 
(Table A2, Appendix) show that training is closer to formalisation than to socialisation or expatriation. This result aligns with Jaussaud 
and Schaaper’s (2006) finding that training constitutes a full control dimension, correlated with their organisational dimension of control, 
which is similar to formalisation. Jaussaud and Schaaper (2006: 
39) explain, in reference to European subsidiaries in China, that ‘formalisation procedures require local employees to be trained in 













Theoretical Control Mechanisms 
Empirical Position of Control Mechanisms in Proposed 
CFS Framework 
Centralisation • Decision making is centralised at HQ 
versus autonomous subsidiaries 
• Reporting to HQ 
• Regional HQ and regional management 
centres 
• ERP 
• Level_centralisation (decision making is centralised at HQ) 
• Centralising_reporting_HQ (reporting to the HQ) 
Formalisation • Organisational structure and processes 
similar to HQ’s 
• Standards and written procedures, 
rules, policies 
• Level of reporting 
• Job descriptions 
• Formalisation_equal_HQ 
• (formalisation is the same worldwide) 
• Level_procedures (written procedures in Asian subsidiaries) 
• Job_descriptions (written job descriptions in the Asian 
subsidiaries) 
• Level_reporting (number of documents subsidiaries must produce) 
Training  • Level_training (level of training of local employees) 
Expatriation • Number of expatriates 
• Functions of expatriates 
• Level_expatriation (number of expatriates) 
• Level_key_functions_expatriates (number of key functions that 
expatriates occupy) 
Socialisation • HQ visits to the subsidiary and short- 
term assignments 
• Informal communication with HQ 
• Training 
• On-the-job rotation; personnel exchange 
• Shared values, corporate culture 
• Socialisation of subsidiary's employees 
• ERP 
• Visits_and_st_assignments (frequent short-term assignments 
to subsidiaries) 
• Informal_contacts (frequent informal contacts of managers 
of subsidiaries with HQ managers) 
• Regional_headquarter (MNC set up regional HQ in the Asia Pacific 
region) 
• Number_RMCs_Asia (number of regional management centres in Asia) 
Notes: Italicised control mechanism in the left column are not validated; italicised control mechanisms in the right column a re validated for a 
control dimension other than the hypothesised one. 
 
 
Articulation of Control Dimensions by MNCs in the Asia Pacific Region 
The principal component analysis provides a means to locate statistical observations (MNCs in our case) on a scatter diagram, such 
that similar observations are positioned close together, and dissimilar observations are distant. Figure 2 represents the factor score 
diagram, with MNCs labelled by their coded case names. The arrows show the directions of the four control dimensions transposed 
from the extended CFS framework, along with the specific mechanism of training, as we identified in the component plot in Figure 1. 
When an MNC is located close to a single arrow and far from the zero point of the plot, it uses the mechanisms of the control dimension 
represented by this arrow more. For example, VA is a highly centralising MNC, whereas KA emphasises formalisation. A subsidiary 
located halfway between two arrows and far from the zero point of the plot simultaneously uses both groups of control dimensions: XA 
mixes centralisation and formalisation. When an MNC is located opposite an arrow, away from the zero point, it does not use the control 
dimension identified by that arrow. For example, WB avoids intense formalisation. Finally, MNCs located near the origin mix together 
all the control mechanisms, as exemplified by HB. The hierarchical cluster tree of the object scores (Figure A2, Appendix) shows five 
clusters of MNCs, as encircled in Figure 2. 
We summarise the implementation of control dimensions from the extended CFS framework and some main character istics of the 
MNCs in each cluster in Table 6. The assessment of the intensity of use of a control dimensions includes two complementary steps. First, 
we computed the mean scores of each cluster on the composite CFS variables. For example, the composite centralisation variable is the 
mean of Level_centralisation of decision making and Centralised_reporting_HQ. Second, we checked the reliability of these scores, 
which span from (--), or ‘not at all’, to (++), or ‘a lot’, with a zero point in the centre of the scale.  
The MNCs in the first cluster, located in opposition to centralisation on the principal component factor score map, exercise high total 
control over their subsidiaries in Asia and high efforts on all dimensions other than centralised decision making and reporting. Most 
MNCs in this cluster are giant companies, with a range of activities in Asia, including many factories to manage and high turnover in 
the region. They all have set up important regional HQ, mostly in Singapore, Hong Kong or Shanghai, and regional management centres, 
in which they de- or recentralise important operational and strategic functions (e.g., analysis of reporting, regional strategic 
development, senior human resource management). 
In the second cluster, the MNCs do not emphasise centralisation. They manage subsidiaries, mostly wholly owned, in many Asian 
countries, and their Asian turnover, though not huge in absolute value, represents a rather high percentage (up to 40%) of their global 
turnover (JB, OB). Similar to the first group, they have regional HQs that possess autonomy for regional decision making and reporting. 
However, these MNCs accentuate the formalisation dimension of control, based on widely deployed ERP, and place less emphasis on 
expatriation and socialisation. The reason for their high formalisation is their size; these medium-sized and large MNCs, unlike giant 
ones, lack the resources required to implement all control dimensions simultaneously. 
 
TABLE 6 






























































































(AA, AB, DA, DB, EB, 




















• Giant MNCs 
• High presence in Asia Pacific (number of countries, employees, 
factories, turnover) 
• ERP deployed worldwide 





(EA, HA, HB, JA, JB, KA, 



















• Medium-sized and big MNCs 
• High presence in Asia Pacific (number of countries, employees) 
• Relatively important share of Asia Pacific activities 
• ERP deployed worldwide 




(CA, QB, RA, RB, SA, 













• Small-scale MNCs 
• Not many factories but relatively high turnover in Asia Pacific 

















- - - - 
• Medium-sized and big MNCs 
• Important factories and employment in the Asia Pacific region 
• Relatively important number of international joint ventures 

















• Small- and medium-sized MNCs 
• Factories in Asia Pacific region 
• Medium turnover in the Asia Pacific region 
 Sum +++++ ++ ++ - - - -   
  
The 23 MNCs in clusters 3–5 all emphasise centralisation. But they also implement the other control dimensions in different ways 
and with different intensities. For example, the MNCs in the third cluster rely on a mix of formalisation, training and expatriation. 
Although these MNCs do not set up regional HQ, they exert strong overall control. This cluster is mostly composed of small-scale and 
medium-sized MNCs that earn high turnover in Asia but do not locate large factories there. Because Asian markets are important for 
these MNCs, they exercise high control over their Asian (marketing) subsidiaries, which remains centralised at their global HQ. 
Almost solely relying on centralisation, with some training, the MNCs of the fourth group exercise relatively low control over their 
activities in Asia. Some MNCs, though not all, have set up regional HQ in the Asia Pacific region. These MNCs are big and giant, with 
the necessary resources to implement more control dimensions, but they achieve low turnover in the Asia Pacific region. Some of them 
have many factories that employ large numbers of local workers. Therefore, the training they provide aims to improve production 
quality. Control over these (production) subsidiaries remains highly centralised at HQ. 
Finally, the MNCs in the fifth cluster are distinct; in addition to centralisation, they implement all other dimensions of control, 
including setting up regional HQ. They are mostly small-scale and medium-sized and have relatively few factories in Asia to manage, 
but they realise important turnover in just a few key countries (e.g., China, Japan). 
 
Discussion 
The dilemma between expanding quickly in Asia while containing the costs of control in such a far away location led us to ask: Do new 
control mechanisms (e.g., ERP, short-term assignments, regional headquarters) fit the well-established CFS control framework? How do 
MNCs implement and articulate such mechanisms to retain control over their networks of subsidiaries? 
 
Four Control Dimensions 
French MNCs retain control over their Asian networks of subsidiaries by articulating four main dimensions: 
Centralisation of decision making and reporting at HQ, which matches the traditional centralisation dimension from the CFS 
framework. 
1. Formalisation of the organisation of subsidiaries and the relations between subsidiaries and HQ, in line with for- 
malisation from the CFS framework. 
2. Informal contacts and socialisation, through intensive short-term missions and visits, facilitated by the establishment of 
regional HQ in the Asia Pacific, matching the socialisation dimension. 
3. Expatriation, which also pertains to the socialisation dimension in the CFS framework. 
4. Training of local employees also constitutes a control mechanism (Martinez and Jarillo 1989; Gerringer and Frayn 1990; Child and Yan 
2003; Ambos and Schlegelmilsch 2007). We find that it is shared across the four previous dimensions (Table 4). 
We have argued that regional management structures in Asia, with increasingly important control functions, help centralise decision 
making at the regional level. The content analysis of our interviews shows that developing a regional Asian organisation, such as a 
regional HQ, increases recourse to short-term assignments from HQ and enhances the informal contacts between managers in Asia and 
at HQ. Thus, regional HQs clearly serve a socialisation function. However, this development of regional organisations in Asia correlates 
negatively with the control mechanisms related to centralisation (see Table A2, Appendix). Thus, regional HQ actually decentralise 
decision making and reporting away from the global HQ, in a process we call the ‘recentralisation of decision making and reporting at 
regional HQ’. 
In line with Ghoshal and Nohria (1998) and Nobel and Birkinshaw (1998), we find that intensive travel, including short- term 
assignments from HQ to Asia, is a core element of socialisation. Our interviews also show, in line with Welch et al. (2007: 180), that 
‘international business travellers have the capacity to act as powerful knowledge transfer agents in terms of internal interaction between 
company units’. 
In parallel with their globalisation, many MNCs have implemented ERP, which might lead to more centralised and formalised 
decision making, though some studies show that paradoxically, ERP enhances informal communication. We find that ERP does not fit 
any specific control dimension. To specify the possible roles of ERP, in terms of control, in Table 7 we present the correlations of ERP 
with other mechanisms of control. 
These correlations suggest that ERP opposes centralised decision making and reporting to HQ (r = -0.30; p = 0.04) but correlates with 
formalisation and training and, to some extent, socialisation. Although ERP enables more central control, it does not appear to lead to 
this outcome. On the basis of this evidence, we posit that ERP actually is more a data collection and sharing device (Shen et al. 2016) 
rather than a control mechanism. Overall, ERP emerges as a mechanism shared by the socialisation/ regional recentralisation, 
formalisation and training dimensions of control, opposed to centralisation (Schwartz and Brock 1998; Davenport 1998; Wang 2007). 
These findings in turn can inform the ongoing discussions in academic literature about how to implement ERP, in three main realms. 
First, Davenport (1998: 6) argues that ERPs lead to higher degrees of centralisation, but the availability of real-time data streamlines 
management structures and may create more flexible and decentralised organisations. We find that this decentralisation effect of ERP 
predicted by Davenport outweighs the centralisation effect of control he anticipated, in line with Pfeffer and Leblebici (1977) and Wang 
(2007). 
 
Second, ERP underutilisation remains a serious challenge for organisations (Hsieh and Wang 2007, Mass et al. 2014). Although ERP 
systems can reinforce control structures as desired by management (Mass et al. 2014), subordinates and colleagues may tend to be less 
inclined to use the ERP system extensively (Murphy and Chang, 2012). 
Third, the problem of ERP uniformity is crucial for MNCs. Differences in regional markets remain so profound that strict uniformity 
likely will prove counterproductive (Davenport 1998; Anandarajan et al. 2002). In our interviews, several respondents complained that 
global ERP often fails to account for specific pieces of information related to the Asian subsidiaries, their staff or their products, 
particularly if the information appeared in the local language (e.g. addresses in Chinese characters). This issue suggests what Davenport 
(1998: 8) has called ‘a federalist operating model’. 
 
Combinations of the CFS Dimensions for Control 
As already mentioned, a paucity of research investigates the combinations of different dimensions of control. Nearly half of the MNCs 
in our sample controlled their subsidiaries using strongly centralised decision making and reporting. The other half stressed less 
centralisation but compensated by implementing a balanced mix of other control dimensions. For example, MNCs recentralise decision 
making and reporting for operational and strategic functions at regional HQ in the Asia Pacific region, where they pool a relatively large 
number of expatriates and frequently send managers from HQ on short-term assignments and visits. 
The summary in Table 6 reveals that the French MNCs in our sample place training of local staff (managers, employees and workers) 
and the formalisation of subsidiaries at the centre of their international control systems. Table 6 highlights another trend too: Expatriates 
have become less prominent. The challenges of finding enough expatriates to manage the growing number of subsidiaries in Asia have 
forced the MNCs in our sample to entrust more key positions to local managers and engineers (Legewie 2002; Belderbos and Heijltjes 
2005). This transfer of key positions requires substantial efforts to train future managers, in Asia and the MNC’s home country. Such 
training entails the development of skills and a greater understanding of the corporate culture. Gradually, expatriates can be substituted 




Correlation of ERP with other mechanisms 
(ranked from +1 to -1). 
ERP Correlation Significance 
Level of training 0.50 0.00 
Formalisation equal to HQ 0.48 0.00 
Level of reporting 0.42 0.00 
Level of written procedures 0.36 0.01 
Job descriptions 0.31 0.04 
Number of regional management 
centres in Asia 
0.28 0.05 
Visits and short-term 
assignments 
0.27 0.07 
Regional HQ 0.26 0.08 
Level of key functions performed 
by expatriates 
0.18 0.22 (NS) 
Informal contacts with HQ 0.16 0.28 (NS) 
Level of expatriation -0.03 0.84 (NS) 
Centralised reporting to HQ -0.30 0.04 
Centralisation of decision making -0.34 0.02 
 
 
Combinations of Control Dimensions: Five Patterns 
Our empirical study reveals five groups of homogeneous MNCs that exercise different degrees of control, from strong to weak, by 
implementing different mixes of the control dimensions outlined in the extended CFS framework. Tight controllers are mainly big and 
giant MNCs that recentralise decision making and reporting at regional HQ in Asia and exert effort to achieve formalisation, train Asian 
employees, both locally and through international training programs for high-potential managers and engineers, while still sending 
many expatriates to Asian subsidiaries and regional HQ. Formalisers set up smaller, regional HQs in Asia but still centralise information 
through highly developed formalisation, based on global ERP. In addition, they emphasise training of local Asian employees. Loose 
controllers are MNCs with a relatively high turnover in Asia. They centralise control at HQ through reporting. Despite their limited 
  
resources, they send a few expatriates to Asia and offer some training to their local employees. Strong centralisers centralise all their 
international control and comparatively do not put much effort into the other dimensions of control. This group is characterised by rather 
low turnover in Asia and relatively many international joint ventures to manage. Finally, balanced controllers are mostly middle-sized 
MNCs that centralise control through reporting but also develop all other dimensions of control to some extent.  
In defining these groups, a key factor seems to be the size of the MNC. Most big and giant MNCs exert strong overall control by 
implementing all control dimensions, including regional HQ, that enable them to recentralise their strategic decision making and 
reporting. According to our content analysis, compared with smaller MNCs, giant MNCs formalise the relations between the parent 
company and subsidiaries in Asia more, implement widely deployed ERP systems, develop coherent training programs for local 
employees, locate key management positions in subsidiaries and send many managers and technicians from their global subsidiary 
network on short-term assignments to Asia. In contrast, smaller MNCs (Table 3) most often base their international control systems on 
just one or two dimensions, such as combining centralised decision making with strong formalisation, as well as the presence of an 
expatriate who is responsible for the daily operations of the subsidiary (e.g. production, reporting, local recruitment, informal contacts 
with managers at HQ). However, size is not a stand-alone determinant, in that in each cluster, we find MNCs of all different sizes. 
A second mitigating factor is the level of sales that MNCs realise in the Asia Pacific region. The greater the importance of Asian 
markets in the global portfolio of an MNC, the more control it exerts. In contrast, the number of factories that an MNC manages in the 
Asia Pacific region has less influence over its degree of control. When MNCs have important production activities but low turnover in 





This research finds that new forms of control—especially ERP, increased travel and the reinforcement of regional headquarters—fit the well-
established, theoretical, centralisation–formalisation–socialisation (CFS) framework. 
It appears that French MNCs base the control of their net- works of subsidiaries in Asia on the articulation of four main dimensions of 
control: (1) centralisation of decision making and reporting; (2) formalised organisation of subsidiaries and HQ–subsidiary relations; (3) 
socialisation through intensive short-term missions, HQ visits to Asia and frequent informal contacts, facilitated by the presence of a 
regional HQ; and (4) expatriation. Moreover, training emerges as a control mechanism that is shared by the previous dimensions. 
Increased travel and the regional organisation of an MNC fit the socialisation dimension of control. Big and giant MNCs set up regional 
HQ in Asia, where they recentralise decision making for operational and strategic functions, pool a relatively large number of expatriates 
and send managers from HQ on short-term assignments and for visits. Yet ERP does not fit any specific control dimension and instead 
supports socialisation, regional recentralisation and formalisation but opposes centralisation. 
Furthermore, our research shows that MNCs combine the centralisation, formalisation, socialisation and expatriation dimensions of 
control with different weights and intensities. Specifically, five patterns, reflecting different combinations of control dimensions by MNCs, 
reveal that they exercise different degrees of control, from weak to strong, by implementing different mixes of the control dimensions. The 
factors that differentiate the five groups include the global size of the MNC and the importance of its sales, in absolute values, in Asia. 
From a broader perspective, this study makes several key contributions. From a theoretical point of view, we extend the classical CFS 
framework. Furthermore, we shed light on the effects of ERP: Although it can help companies share a lot of information efficiently, it does 
not lead to increased centralisation of control. From a methodological point of view, we show that a quantitative approach, using a large 
qualitative sample, offers new perspectives for research in international management. 
Yet this research also suffers some shortcomings that might be addressed in further work. First, we have not taken subsidiary roles into 
account, even though HQ do not necessarily control subsidiaries with different functional roles (production, sales, R&D) and different 
geographical scopes in the same ways (Ghoshal and Nohria 1989). Investigating this dimension would require an in-depth analysis of how 
each of the 47 MNCs differentiates control, according to the subsidiaries’ roles. Second, even with the relatively large number of MNCs we 
consider, generalising our conclusions demands caution. They might not strictly apply to MNCs from countries other than France. 
Although most of our findings are in line with previous research, our conclusions still should be qualified in host regions that are less 
dynamic than Asia or culturally and institutionally less different from the home region of the MNC. A broader quantitative approach 
eventually may help confirm our results and shed further light on the questions we investigate. 
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Operationalisation of variables: questions on the interview guide, coding and principle component analysis variables perationalisation of variables 
Control Dimension Measure by Prior Literature Question on Interview Guide Coding Variable on the Factor Map 
Centralisation Decision making is 
centralised at HQ versus 
autonomous subsidiaries 
Who makes the strategic decisions in the Asia Pacific 
region? Who makes the operational decisions in the AP 
region? When discrepancies appear through reporting, 
who takes corrective measures? 
1 = autonomous subsidiaries 
2 = shared subs./RHQ 
3 = autonomous RHQ 
4 = shared RHQ/HQ 
5 = centralised at HQ 
Level_centralisation 
Reporting to HQ To whom do your subsidiaries report in a first place? 1 = RHQ 
2 = shared RHQ/HQ 
3 = HQ 
Centralising_reporting_HQ 
Regional headquarters Has your MNCs set up a “Regional Headquarters” in the 
Asia Pacific region? 
0 = no 




Does your company have other regional management 
centres in Asia Pacific (regional offices, platforms, 
coordination centres) 
The number of such regional 
management centres, including RHQ 
Number_RMCs_Asia 
ERP Does your MNC implement an ERP? 
If yes, what functions; worldwide the same? 
1 = no ERP 
2 = weak ERP 
3 = medium ERP 
4 = strong ERP 
5 = very strong ERP 
ERP 
Formalisation Organisational structure 
and processes similar to HQ 
Is formalisation (reporting, written rules, job descriptions) 
the same in the Asia Pacific region and elsewhere in the 
world? Are local adoptions possible? 
1 = not at all 
2 = not much 
3 = rather, local adjustments 
4 = nearly 
5 = identical worldwide 
Formalisation_equal_HQ 
Standards and written 
procedures, rules, policies 
Are there written procedures to be applied in your Asian 
subsidiaries? 
1 = no 
2 = weak 
3 = medium 
4 = strong 
5 = very strong 
Level_procedures 
Job descriptions Are there written job descriptions in your Asian 
subsidiaries? 
1 = no 
2 = weak 
3 = medium 
4 = strong 
5 = very strong 
Job_descriptions 
Level of reporting How many reporting documents do subsidiaries have to 
produce and with what frequency? 
1 = no 
2 = weak 
3 = medium 
4 = strong 






Operationalisation of variables: questions on the interview guide, coding and principle component analysis variables perationalisation of variables 
Control Dimension Measure by Prior Literature Question on Interview Guide Coding Variable on the Factor Map 
Socialisation/ 
informal control 
HQ visits to the subsidiary Are there frequently short-term assignments sent to the 
subsidiaries in Asia. Who comes and with what frequency? 
1 = no 
2 = very few (1 or 2 per year) 
3 = medium (quarterly) 
4 = frequent (monthly) 




Frequency of informal contacts between managers of 
subsidiaries and regional HQ in Asia and managers at HQ 
1 = no 
2 = few (yearly, 6 months) 
3 = some (2-3 months, quarterly) 
4 = frequent (monthly) 
5 = very frequent (daily, weekly) 
Informal_contacts 
 Training Training of local employees: intensity; who (employees, 
managers, engineers); where (local, regional, 
international); by who (internal, external) 
1 = no training 
2 = few training, local 
3 = some training 
4 = much training, regional 





Do you send managers/technicians to subsidiaries in 
Asia? Do you practice job rotation? 
Small- and medium-sized MNCs do not practice exchanges or job 
rotation. There were not enough cases to codify. This variable was 
excluded. 
 Shared values, corporate 
culture 
Shared values, corporate culture Small- and medium-sized MNCs do not have a clear policy for diffusing 
shared values and corporate culture. There were not enough cases to 
codify. This variable was excluded 
Socialisation of subsidiary’s 
employees 
Are there socialisation actions toward subsidiary 
managers and other local employees? 
Question badly understood in certain cases, such that respondents 
confused socialisation with social and health insurance. We did not 
codify. 
Expatriate control Number of expatriates What is the normal number of expatriates your MNC sends 
to subsidiaries in the Asia Pacific region? 
1 = very few (0 or 1 sometimes) 
2 = few, 1 or 2 
3 = medium, 3 to 5 
4 = many, 5 to 10 
5 = enormously, more than 10 
Level_expatriation 
Functions of expatriates What are the functions of the expatriates? Number of key management functions 








Dendogram using Ward 
Linkage Rescaled 
Distance Cluster Combine 
FIGURE A1 
Hierarchical clustering of variables 
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